Chapter Five
All “Men” Are Created Equal: Decoding the Jurisprudence of the Conservative Justices of SCOTUS in a Nutshell
(This chapter was first published on Medium on 11/25/25 at https://medium.com/@t.higginson/all-men-are-created-equal-decoding-the-jurisprudence-of-the-conservative-justices-of-scotus-in-a-ed99238633e1)
To decode the jurisprudence of the conservative justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, the key is to examine this famous sentence of Declaration of Independence:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”
Within that sentence, this phrase is key :
“all men are created equal”
In that phrase, this word is the key:
“men.”
Understanding and applying their definition of “men” to each case they have decided to hear provides the leverage for predicting their decisions and for understanding their the decisions and dissents.
Under their “originalist” jurisprudence, “men” means white, straight men of Western European descent, primarily from English, French and German speaking countries. For these justices, the most important (and highest predictive indicator) subset are “men” who are land owners, gun owners and come from a Christian origin.
Everyone else is perhaps at most three-fifths men for purposes of their interpretation of the Constitution. Women are not full “men.” Minorities are not full “men.” Gays and trans people are not full “men.”
The rights granted, whether explicitly or implicitly, under the Constitution to their classification of “men” are, by default, accorded very broad protection by these justices. For instance, their interpretation of the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms (while completely distorted from its actual meaning) makes sense in light of this reading of “men.”
In contrast, but easily decoded by applying this restricted classification of who constitutes “men,” these justices’ decisions provide limited or no protection for rights that are perceived by these justices as somehow impinging on the rights of “men.”
In contrast, for these justices, the rights of “non-men” are inherently suspect. In the light of these justices’ Charlie Kirk-level of substance originalist jurisprudenc, any rights of “non-men” must be literally and precisely spelled out in the actual words of the Constitution. Any legislation that expands the rights of “non-men” is also suspect, and they will likely decide to allow only a limited scope for that legislation, or they will decide that the legislation is entirely unconstitutional.